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Abstract
In this paper we study a mean field model for discrete time, finite number of states, dynamic games. These models arise in
situations that involve a very large number of agents moving from state to state according to certain optimality criteria. The mean
field approach for optimal control and differential games was introduced by Lasry and Lions (2006, 2007) [3–5]. The discrete time,
finite state space setting is motivated both by its independent interest as well as by numerical analysis questions which appear in the
discretization of the problems introduced by Lasry and Lions. The main contribution of this paper is the exponential convergence
to equilibrium of the initial-terminal value problem.
© 2009 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
Résumé
On propose dans cet article un modèle de champ moyen, en temps discret et en nombre fini d’états pour des jeux dynamiques.
Ces modèles sont naturels dans le cas d’un très grand nombre d’agents qui opèrent en fonction de certains critères d’optimalité.
L’approche de champ moyen en contrôle optimal et pour des jeux différentiels a été introduite par Lasry et Lions. Le problème en
temps discret et pour un nombre fini d’états est intéressant en lui-même en analyse numérique dans la discrétisation des problèmes
introduits par Lasry et Lions. L’essentiel de cet article porte sur la convergence exponentielle vers l’équilibre d’un problème de
valeur initiale et finale.
© 2009 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we study a mean field model for discrete time, finite number of states, dynamic games. These models
arise in situations that involve a very large number of agents moving from state to state according to certain opti-
mality criteria. The mean field approach for optimal control and differential games (continuous state and time) was
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D.A. Gomes et al. / J. Math. Pures Appl. 93 (2010) 308–328 309introduced by Lasry and Lions [3–5]. In the continuous state and time setting, mean field problems gives rise to
Hamilton–Jacobi equations coupled with transport equations. The discrete time, finite state space setting is motivated
both by its independent interest as well as by numerical analysis questions which appear in the discretization of the
problems introduced by Lasry and Lions. The discretization of these models has been studied by Capuzzo–Dolcetta
and Achdou [1].
Our setting is the following: we assume that there is a very large number of identical agents which can be in
a finite number of states. Each agent behaves individually and rationally, moving from state to state according to
certain optimality criteria. Furthermore, its decisions are based solely on the following information, which is know
by every agent, the current state, and the fraction of agents in each state. As in non-cooperative games, there may be
interactions between the players in different states, as we will explain in more detail bellow. Because the number of
agents is very large, we assume the mean field hypothesis, that is, that only the fraction πni of players in each state i
at time n is the relevant information for the global evolution. The mathematical justification of mean field models has
been investigated extensively by Lions and Lasry in yet to be published papers and we do not address these issues in
this work.
Let d > 1 and N  1 be natural numbers, representing, respectively, the number of possible states in which the
agents can be at any given time, and the total duration of the process. Let π0 and V N be given d-dimensional vectors.
We suppose that π0 is a probability vector, the initial probability distribution of agents among states, and that V N ,
the terminal cost, is an arbitrary vector. The agents look for minimizing a running cost, which depends on π , plus
the terminal cost V N . In contrast with optimal control, where usually only the terminal cost V N is necessary to solve
the problem, in mean-field games both the initial distribution of agents π0 and the terminal cost V N are necessary to
determine the solutions, that is, the distribution of players πn and value function V n, for 0 nN . A solution to the
mean field game is a sequence of pairs of d-dimensional vectors,{(
πn,V n
);0 nN},
where πn is the probability distribution of agents among states at time n and V nj is the expected minimum total cost for
an agent at state j , at time n. These pairs must satisfy certain optimality conditions that we describe in what follows:
at every time step, the agents in state i choose a transition probability, Pij , from state i to state j . Given the transition
probabilities Pnij at time 0 n < N , the distribution of agents at time n + 1 is simply,
πn+1j =
∑
i
πni P
n
ij .
Associated to this choice there is a transition cost cij (π,P ). In the special case in which cij only depends on π and on
the i-th line of P we use the simplified notation cij (π,Pi·). This last case arises when the choices of players in states
j = i do not influence the transition cost to an agent in state i. Let ei(π,P,V ) be the average cost that agents which
are in state i incur when matrix P is chosen, given the current distribution π and the cost vector V at the subsequent
instant. We assume that
ei(π,P,V ) =
∑
j
cij (π,P )Pij + VjPij .
Define the probability simplex S = {(q1, . . . , qd);qj  0∀j,∑dj=1 qj = 1}. The set of d × d stochastic matrices is
identified with Sd . Given a stochastic matrix P ∈ Sd and a probability vector q ∈ S, we define P(P, q, i) to be the
d × d stochastic matrix obtained from P by replacing the i-th row by q , and leaving all others unchanged.
Definition 1. Fix a probability vector π ∈ S and a cost vector V ∈Rd . A stochastic matrix P ∈ Sd is a Nash minimizer
of e(π, ·,V ) if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , d} and any q ∈ S,
ei(π,P,V ) ei
(
π,P(P, q, i),V ).
Definition 2. Suppose that for each π ∈ S and V ∈Rd there exists a Nash minimizer P ∈ Sd of e(π, ·,V ). Let N  1,
π0 ∈ S (the initial distribution of states), and V N ∈Rd (the terminal cost).
A sequence of pairs of d-dimensional vectors,{(
πn,V n
);0 nN},
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V ni =
∑
j cij
(
πn,P n
)
Pnij + V n+1j P nij ,
πn+1j =
∑
i π
n
i P
n
ij ,
(1)
for some Nash minimizer Pn ∈ Sd of e(πn, ·,V n+1).
Until the end of this section we will assume that for all (π,V ) ∈ S×Rd there exists a unique Nash minimizer P¯
of e(π,P,V ). Conditions which guarantee the uniqueness of a Nash minimizer will be studied in Section 3.2. Under
the uniqueness of a Nash minimizer for e, we can define the (backwards) evolution operator for the value function:
Gπ (V ) = e(π, P¯ ,V ), (2)
as well as the (forward) evolution operator for π ,
KV (π) = πP¯ . (3)
Since the operator Gπ commutes with addition with constants, it can be regarded as a map from Rd/R to Rd/R. Here
R
d/R is the set of equivalence classes of vectors in Rd whose components differ by the same constant. In Rd/R we
define the norm:
‖ψ‖# := inf
λ∈R‖ψ + λ‖. (4)
In this paper we will regard Gπ , depending on what is convenient, as both a map in Rd as well as a map in Rd/R.
We have the compact equivalent form for (1):{
V n = Gπn
(
V n+1
)
,
πn+1 = KV n+1
(
πn
)
.
(5)
In this paper we will consider solutions to (5) which satisfy initial-terminal value conditions, π0 (or π−N ) and V N ,
as well as stationary solutions, that we discuss in what follows.
Definition 3. A pair of vectors (π¯, V¯ ) is a stationary solution to the mean field game if there exists a constant λ¯, called
critical value, such that {
V¯ = Gπ¯ (V¯ ) + λ¯,
π¯ = KV¯ (π¯).
(6)
We should remark that the first equation in (6) can be written in Rd/R as Gπ (V¯ ) = V¯ . Therefore, solutions to (6)
can be regarded as fixed points of (Gπ ,KV ) in Rd/R× S.
The structure of the paper is as follows: we first start, in Section 2 by listing our main assumptions, as well as
explaining where they are needed in the paper. In Section 3 we address the issue of existence, Theorem 1, and unique-
ness, Theorem 2, of Nash-minimizing transition matrices. Some general properties of the operator G are studied in
Section 4. In Section 5 we establish several results concerning the existence, Theorem 3, and uniqueness, Proposi-
tions 7, 8 and Theorem 4, of stationary solutions to mean field games. The initial-terminal value problem is studied
in Section 6. We show also existence, Theorem 5, and uniqueness, Theorem 6, of solutions for this problem. Both in
the stationary and initial-terminal value problem the uniqueness proofs use a version of the monotonicity argument of
Lasry and Lions in [3–5]. In the last section of the paper we prove the main result of the paper, namely the exponential
convergence to a stationary solution of (π0,V 0), as N → ∞, for the initial-terminal value problem with (fixed) data
π−N and V N . More precisely, in Theorem 7, we prove that, as we take the initial and terminal conditions far apart
(n = ±N ), the solutions at n = 0 converge exponentially to a stationary solution. Throughout the paper we discuss
with detail the entropy penalized problem For this model we give an independent proof of existence of stationary
solutions, Proposition 9 and study the large entropy limit, Proposition 10. Another important example is the optimal
stationary solutions, discussed in Section 5.7 which give a variational interpretation of a solution of certain mean field
games in terms of non-linear programming problems, Proposition 11.
The authors are grateful to P.L. Lions for his comments and suggestions about the results in this paper.
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In this section, for the convenience of the reader, we list the main assumptions that will be needed in the text.
We list here only the assumptions that will be used in the main results or the ones which are repeatedly used in the
text. A few other assumptions will be introduced later in the text and will only be used “locally” in the section they
are stated.
The first two assumptions will be used in Theorem 1, Section 3.1, to establish existence of a Nash minimizer of e.
Assumption 1. For each π ∈ S, V ∈ Rd , P ∈ Sd , and each index 1 i  d , the mapping q 	→ ei(π,P(P, q, i),V ),
defined for q ∈ S, and taking values on R, is convex.
Assumption 2. The map P 	→ ei(π,P,V ) is continuous for all i.
Concerning the uniqueness of Nash minimizers, addressed in §3.2, we need the following definition (see [2] for
the motivation of this assumption):
Definition 4. A function g :Rd×d →Rd×d is diagonally convex if for all P 1,P 2 ∈Rd , P 1 = P 2, we have:∑
ij
(
P 1ij − P 2ij
)(
gij
(
P 1
)− gij (P 2))> 0.
With this definition we can state the next assumption:
Assumption 3. Let
gij (P ) = ∂ei(π,P,V )
∂Pij
.
Then g is diagonally convex.
Since diagonal convexity may not be the unique way to ensure uniqueness of Nash minimizers, it is convenient
to add uniqueness as an assumption, which obviously holds under Assumptions 1–3, but which can also hold under
other alternative hypothesis.
Assumption 4. For each (π,V ) there exists a unique Nash minimizer P(π,V ) of e(π, ·,V ).
The uniqueness of P(π,V ) makes the operators KV and Gπ well defined. Therefore, from Section 5 on we will always
suppose that Assumption 4 holds, even without explicit mention.
To establish continuity of P(π,V ), Section 3.3, Proposition 1, we need:
Assumption 5. For each index 1 i  d , ei : S× Sd ×Rd →R is a continuous function.
Denote by ρi,i′(P ) the matrix we obtain from P by replacing its i′-th row by its i-th row, and leaving all other rows
(including the i-th) unchanged.
Assumption 6. There exists C > 0 such that for all i and i′, and any π ∈ S, P ∈ Sd ,∑
j
∣∣cij (π,P ) − ci′j (π,ρi,i′(P ))∣∣Pij  C. (7)
Note that the previous assumption holds if cij is bounded, for instance.
Some of the results of the paper only hold for transition costs which have a special dependence on P . The next
assumption will be required frequently:
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To establish uniqueness of solutions (Section 5.4, Proposition 8 and Theorem 4, Section 6.2, Theorem 6), as well as
to obtain exponential convergence to stationary solutions (Section 7, Theorem 7) it is convenient to have the following
assumption on the operator G:
Assumption 8. There exists a constant γ > 0 such that
π˜ · (Gπ˜ (V ) − Gπ (V ))+ π · (Gπ (V˜ ) − Gπ˜ (V˜ )) γ ‖π − π˜‖2,
for any V, V˜ ∈Rd and all π, π˜ ∈ S.
An example where this last hypothesis is satisfied is the following:
cij (π,Pi·) = Wi(π) + c˜ij (Pi·), (8)
where W is a monotone function, that is,
(π − π˜ ) · (W(π) − W(π˜)) γ ‖π − π˜‖2, (9)
where γ is a positive constant. For instance, the gradient of a convex function is a monotone function: In this case we
have:
Gπ (V )(i) = Wi(π) + min
Pij
∑
j
(
c˜ij (Pi·) + Vj
)
Pij .
The special structure in (8) arises naturally in certain problems, see Section 5.7.
To establish the uniqueness of the critical value we need the following assumption:
Assumption 9. For any π ∈ S, the operator V 	→ Gπ (V ) satisfies the following property: for all V 1, V 2 and any
i ∈ argmax(V 1 − V 2) we have:
Gπ
(
V 1
)
i
− V 1i  Gπ
(
V 2
)
i
− V 2i ,
with the opposite inequality if i ∈ argmin(V 1 − V 2).
As it will be proved in Section 4.1, Proposition 3, Assumption 7 implies Assumption 9. However, we leave it explicit
to make easier the understanding of what follows.
The following strict concavity of G is important to establish uniqueness of stationary solutions and the exponential
convergence to equilibrium.
Assumption 10. For all π ∈ S and all V 1,V 2 ∈Rd we have:
π · (Gπ (V 2)− Gπ (V 1))+ KV 1(π)(V 1 − V 2)−γπ∥∥V 1 − V 2∥∥2#.
This last assumption is a slightly stronger version of inequality (16), which is a consequence of Assumptions 4 and 7.
A final hypothesis allow us to establish certain bounds (Lemma 2 in Section 7.1) which are useful in proving the
exponential convergence to equilibrium:
Assumption 11. There exists K > 0 such that for all π, π˜ ∈ S, and for any matrix P ∈ Sd ,∣∣cij (π,P ) − cij (π˜ ,P )∣∣K. (10)
Note that the previous assumption holds if cij is bounded, for instance.
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In this section we discuss the problem of existence, uniqueness and continuity of the Nash equilibrium transition
matrix P. As we will see, this problem is non-trivial and requires, in the general case, the use of Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem, see Theorem 1 in Section 3.1. Once existence is established, uniqueness can be proven for a general class
of cost functionals, Theorem 2 in Section 3.2. We finish this section with the discussion of a special case: the entropy
penalized model, Section 3.4.
3.1. Existence in the general case
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for any pair of vectors π and V there exists a Nash
minimizer P of e(π, ·,V ).
Proof. Given a stochastic matrix P , define Fi(P ) to be the set of vectors in S given by:
Fi(P ) = argminq∈S ei
(
π,P(P, q, i),V ).
The set Fi(P ) is non-empty and convex. Define F(P ) = F1(P ) × F2(P ) × · · · × Fd(P ), where we identify the
Cartesian product with the set of all stochastic matrices where the i-th row belongs to Fi(P ). Clearly, F(P ) is convex
for all P . Furthermore, as we argue next, the graph {(P ;F(P ));P ∈ Sd} is closed. Indeed, suppose that Pn → P 0
and take Qn ∈ F(P n), if Qn → Q0 we want to show that Q0 ∈ F(P 0). Fix i and call qni the i-th coordinate of Qn,
then by hypothesis ei(π,P(P n, qni , i),V ) ei(π,P(P n, q ′, i),V ) for all q ′ ∈ S. As qni → q0i and Pn → P 0 we have
that P(P n, qni , i) → P(P 0, q0i , i) then we get that ei(π,P(P 0, q0i , i),V ) ei(π,P(P 0, q ′, i),V ) for all q ′ ∈ S.
Then, because for each P , F(P ) is a convex set and the graph (P,F (P )) is closed, we can apply Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem, which implies the existence of a matrix P that belongs to F(P ). Thus P is a Nash minimizer of
e(π, ·,V ). 
3.2. Uniqueness for diagonally convex costs
As shown in the previous section, if Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, for each π and V there exists a transition matrix
P which is a Nash minimizer of e(π, ·,V ). In general, such minimizer may fail to be unique. Under the diagonally
convex Assumption 3 we will show uniqueness.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumptions 1–3 hold. Then there exists a unique transition matrix P which is a Nash minimizer
of e(π, ·,V ).
Proof. Note that if P is any Nash minimizer of e(π, ·,V ), its i-th line solves the constrained optimization problem:
min
q
ei
(
π,P(P, q, i),V ),
qi  0,∑
i
qi = 1.
Thus, if P 1 and P 2 are two Nash minimizers, they satisfy the KKT conditions [6]:
∂ei(π,P
k,V )
∂Pij
− νki − θkij = 0, k = 1,2,∑
j
Pij − 1 = 0,
and θijPij = 0,
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∑
j Pij = 1 and θij  0 corresponds to the constraint Pij  0.
From the first of the three equations above we conclude that∑
ij
(
P 1ij − P 2ij
)(
gij
(
P 1
)− gij (P 2)− ν1i + ν2i − θ1ij + θ2ij )= 0.
Therefore, using the diagonally convex property, we have:∑
ij
(
P 1ij − P 2ij
)(−ν1i + ν2i − θ1ij + θ2ij )< 0,
which implies, when we use θkijP
k
ij = 0 that∑
ij
(−P 1ij ν1i − P 2ij ν2i + P 1ij ν2i + P 2ij ν1i + P 1ij θ2ij + P 2ij θ1ij )< 0.
Now we can use that ∑
j
P kij ν
l
i = νli , ∀1 l, k  2,
to get: ∑
ij
(
P 1ij θ
2
ij + P 2ij θ1ij
)
< 0.
Since P 1ij θ
2
ij ,P
2
ij θ
1
ij  0, we obtain a contradiction. 
3.3. Uniqueness and continuity
Suppose Assumption 4 holds. Consider the map which associates to each pair (π,V ) its unique optimizing tran-
sition matrix P(π,v). Is it natural to ask whether this map is a continuous function. This is addressed in the next
proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumptions 4–5 hold. Then P(π,V ) is a continuous function of π and V .
Proof. Consider sequences πn → π and Vn → V . The corresponding sequence of Nash minimizers Pn = P(πn,Vn)
converges to a Nash minimizer, by the continuity of e, Assumption 5. Therefore, by the uniqueness hypothesis
(Assumption 4) P(πn,Vn) → P(π,V ). 
3.4. The entropy penalized model
Now we consider a special example, the entropy penalized model. We fix a positive constant 
, and consider assume
that cij (π,Pi·) = c˜ij (π) + 
 ln(Pij ), where c˜ij is a continuous function of π . For simplicity we will drop the ∼.
We have:
ei(π,P,V ) =
∑
j
Pij
(
cij (π) + 
 lnPij + Vj
)
. (11)
The term 
Pij lnPij , with 
 > 0, is related to entropy and forces the agents to diversify their transition choices by
enforcing a penalty if they do not do so.
It is easy to prove that there exists a unique Nash minimizing transition matrix given by:
Pij (π,V ) = e
− cij (π)+Vj

∑
k e
− cik (π)+Vk


. (12)
Also, this transition matrix is a continuous function of π and V .
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∂2Gπ (V )i
∂Vk∂Vl
= pkpl − pkδkl


≡ Jkl,
where
pk = e
− cik (π)+Vk

∑
m e
− cim(π)+Vm


. (13)
Because
∑
k Jkl = 0, the matrix Jkl has a zero eigenvalue, which is a reflection of the fact that Gπ commutes with
addition of constants. As we show in the next proposition this eigenvalue is simple.
Proposition 2. Suppose 0 < pk < 1,
∑
k pk = 1 and let,
Jkl = pkpl − pkδkl


.
Then 0 has simple multiplicity.
Proof. Observe that
J = 1


D(Q − I ),
where
D = diag{p1, . . . , pn},
and
Qkl = pl.
If 0 is not a simple eigenvalue, it would mean that there exists w and v which are linearly independent eigenvectors
corresponding to this eigenvalue. But then v and w are eigenvectors of Q corresponding to the eigenvalue 1. But this
contradicts Perron–Frobenius theorem because the eigenvalue 1 is a simple eigenvalue of Q. 
4. Properties of G
In this section we discuss the main properties of the operator G. In Section 4.1 we show that Assumption 9 is
a consequence of Assumptions 4 and 7, and in Section 4.2 we study concavity properties of G. A-priori bounds,
essential to establishing existence of stationary solutions are considered in Section 4.3 and, finally, in Section 4.4 we
prove strict concavity of G for the entropy penalized model with two states.
4.1. Assumption 9
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumptions 4 and 7 hold. Then Assumption 9 holds.
Proof. Let V k ∈Rd , k = 1,2. Let i ∈ argmaxV 1 − V 2. By adding a constant, we may assume that V 1i = V 2i , and so
because G commutes with the addition of constants, it suffices to check that
Gπ
(
V 1
)
i
 Gπ
(
V 2
)
i
.
Because i is a maximizer of V 1j − V 2j , for all j we have V 1j − V 2j  0, that is V 1j  V 2j . Let P 2ij be such that
Gπ
(
V 2
)
i
=
∑
j
cij
(
π,P 2i·
)
P 2ij + V 2k P 2ij .
Then
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(
V 1
)
i

∑
j
cij
(
π,P 2i·
)
P 2ij + V 1j P 2ij 
∑
j
cij
(
π,P 2i·
)
P 2ij + V 2j P 2ij = Gπ
(
V 2
)
i
.
Arguing similarly we obtain the opposite inequality when i ∈ argminV 1 − V 2. 
4.2. Concavity
If Assumption 7 holds, for each fixed index i the mapping,
V 	→ Gπ (V )i,
is concave since
Gπ (V )i = min
Pi·∈S
∑
j
cij (π,Pi·)Pij + VjPij , (14)
is a pointwise minimum of linear functions of V . Furthermore, since π  0,
V 	→ π · Gπ (V )
is also concave.
Suppose that P(π,V ), the transition matrix that realizes the minimum in (14), is differentiable with respect to V .
We will use the notation Pπ,V = P(π,V ). Then
∂Gπ (V )i
∂Vj
= Pπ,Vij .
In general, however, Pπ,V is may not be differentiable. Nevertheless, we have the following rigorous statement:
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumptions 4 and 7 hold. Then
(a) If V 1 and V 2 are any two given vectors, we have
Gπ
(
V 2
)
i
 Gπ
(
V 1
)
i
+
∑
j
P
V 1,π
ij
(
V 2 − V 1)
j
. (15)
(b) If V 2  V 1, then
0 Gπ
(
V 2
)
i
− Gπ
(
V 1
)
i

∑
j
P
V 1,π
ij
(
V 2 − V 1)
j
.
Proof. (a) Observe that
Gπ
(
V 2
)
i

∑
j
cij
(
π,P
V 1,π
i·
)
P
V 1,π
ij + V 2j P V
1,π
ij = Gπ
(
V 1
)
i
+
∑
j
P
V 1,π
ij
(
V 2 − V 1)
j
.
(b) We just need to prove the first inequality. For this, note that
Gπ
(
V 2
)
i
=
∑
j
P
V 2,π
ij
(
V 2j + cij
(
π,P
V2,π
i·
))

∑
j
P
V 2,π
ij
(
V 1j + cij
(
π,P
V2,π
i·
))
 Gπ
(
V 1
)
i
. 
Note that, by multiplying (15) by πi and adding, we obtain:
π · (Gπ (V 2)− Gπ (V 1))− (V 2 − V 1) · KV 1(π) 0. (16)
Since G commutes with the addition of constants it is not possible to establish a strict concavity estimate like
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However, in certain cases it is possible to obtain the following strict concavity estimate:
π · (Gπ (V 2)− Gπ (V 1))+ (V 1 − V 2) · KV 1(π)−γπ∥∥V 1 − V 2∥∥2#.
In Section 4.4 we will give an explicit example.
4.3. A-priori bounds
In the next proposition we give some a-priori bounds which are essential to establishing the existence of fixed
points (Theorem 3).
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumption 6 holds. Then for any (π,V ) ∈ S×Rd and all indices i, i′ we have:∣∣Gπ (V )i − Gπ (V )i′ ∣∣ C. (17)
Proof. Fix π and V let (Gπ ,KV ) be as in (2) and (3). Let P be the optimal transition matrix such that
Gπ (V )i =
∑
j
cij (π,P )Pij + VjPij .
Since replacing the i′-th line by the i-th line in P yields a sub-optimal choice, we have:
Gπ (V )i′ 
∑
j
ci′j
(
π,ρi,i′(P )
)
Pij + VjPij .
Hence
Gπ (V )i′ − Gπ (V )i 
∑
j
[−cij (π,P ) + ci′j (π,ρi,i′(P ))]Pij .
If we exchange the role of i and i′ we have the desired estimate. 
4.4. Strict concavity for the entropy penalized model
To show that the entropy penalized model satisfies the strict concavity property of Assumption 10, it suffices to
show that the restriction of the linear form given by the matrix D2
V 2
Gπ (V )i to the space of vectors X ∈ Rd with∑
k Xk = 0 is uniformly definite positive for each i. This holds because of Proposition 2, which states that the eigen-
value 0 is simple, and the corresponding eigenvector is Y = (1, . . . ,1). The uniformity follows from the a priori
bounds in the previous section, which allow us to assume that ‖V ‖# is bounded. In fact (uniform) strict concavity
only holds for bounded ‖V ‖#. However, for the purposes of this paper this is enough because of the a-priori bounds
in Section 4.3. Thus if cij is bounded and ‖V ‖# is bounded we have 0 < pk < 1, and so Assumption 10 holds.
5. Stationary solutions
In this section we study stationary solutions to mean field games. After the characterization of the critical value, in
Section 5.1, as the average cost for the population of agents, we address the question of uniqueness of the critical value
λ¯ for which (6) admits a solution. In Section 5.2 we give an example where λ¯ is non-unique. However, after addressing
the issue of existence of stationary solutions (in Section 5.3), we revisit the uniqueness problem in Section 5.4 giving
conditions which imply uniqueness λ¯, π¯ and V¯ . These conditions are variations of the monotonicity conditions in [3].
The entropy penalized model is revisited in Section 5.5, and the large entropy limit is considered in Section 5.6,
where we establish uniqueness of stationary solution (Proposition 10). This uniqueness proof uses a strong contraction
argument and is thus suitable for the numerical approximation of large entropy penalized mean field games. We end
this section, in Section 5.7, with a discussion of optimal stationary solutions, where certain variational problems give
rise to mean field games (see [5], §2.6, for related problems).
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We will now give a representation formula for the critical value as the average transition cost.
Proposition 6. Suppose Assumption 4 holds. Let (π¯ , V¯ ) be a stationary solution to (6), and λ¯ the corresponding
critical value. Let P¯ be the optimal transition matrix. Then
λ¯ =
∑
ij
πicij (π¯ , P¯ )P¯ij .
Proof. For each 1 i  d ,
λ¯ =
∑
j
cij (π¯ , P¯ )P¯ij −
(
V¯i −
∑
j
P¯ij V¯j
)
. (18)
Note that
∑
j cij (π¯ , P¯ )P¯ij can be seen as the expected cost of transition agents that are in state i will have when
moving to other states. If we multiply (18) by π¯i and add, for 1 i  d , we get:
λ¯ =
∑
i,j
cij (π¯ , P¯ )π¯i P¯ij −
∑
i,j
(V¯i − V¯j )π¯i P¯ij .
Let μπ¯P¯ denote the probability measure on the set {1,2, . . . , d}2 given by μπ¯P¯ij = πiP¯ij . Since π¯ = π¯ P¯ , we have:∑
i
μπ¯P¯ij =
∑
i
μπ¯P¯j i = πj .
Therefore ∑
i,j
(V¯i − V¯j )π¯i P¯ij =
∑
i,j
(V¯i − V¯j )μπ¯P¯ij = 0.
So
λ¯ =
∑
cij (π¯ , P¯ )μ¯
π¯P¯
ij . 
5.2. Non-uniqueness of the critical value
In this section we show that the critical value may not be unique. Consider the following example: cij (π) given by,
c12 = c21 = 100,
and
c11
(
πθ
)= c22(πθ )= θ,
where πθ = (θ,1 − θ), for 0 θ  1. Then V θ = (0,0), λθ = θ , πθ and
P θ =
[
1 0
0 1
]
is a stationary solution.
5.3. Existence of stationary solutions
Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumptions 4–5 hold. Assume further that there exists C such that for any (π,V ) ∈ S×Rd
and all indices i, i′ we have (17). Then there exists a pair of vectors (π¯ , V¯ ), a constant λ¯ and a transition matrix P¯
such that for all i,
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∑
j
cij (π¯ , P¯ )P¯ij + V¯j P¯ij = V¯i + λ¯,
and π¯ = π¯ P¯ .
Note that (17) will hold, by Proposition 5, if we assume additionally Assumption 6.
Proof. Since 4–5 hold, by Proposition 1, the optimal transition matrix P(π,V ) is a continuous function. Therefore
the operator Gπ (·) : Rd/R→ Rd/R is continuous. Furthermore, by estimate (17), ‖Gπ (V )‖# is uniformly bounded
for any V ∈Rd .
Consider the mapping (Gπ (V ),KV (π)) : (Rd/R) × S → (Rd/R) × S. By Brower’s fixed point theorem this
mapping has a fixed point, which is a stationary solution since{
Gπ¯ (V¯ ) = λ¯ + V¯ ,
KV¯ (π¯) = π¯ .

5.4. Uniqueness of stationary solutions
Now we address the problem of uniqueness of stationary solutions. The results in this section use the mono-
tonicity methods introduced in [3–5] – in this discrete setting, different versions of the hypothesis will yield several
uniqueness results. Under Assumption 8 we will prove, in Proposition 7, the uniqueness of stationary distribution π .
The uniqueness of critical value is established in Proposition 8, using Assumption 9, and finally under Assumption 10
we obtain the uniqueness of π , V and λ in Theorem 4.
Proposition 7. Suppose Assumptions 4, 7, and 8 hold. Let (πk,V k) , k = 1,2, be stationary solutions:
KV k
(
πk
)= πk, Gπk (V k)= λk + V k,
where λk are constants. Then π1 = π2.
Proof. From the hypothesis we have:
0 = (V 1 − V 2) · (KV 1(π1)− π1 − KV2(π2)+ π2)+
+ (π1 − π2)((Gπ2(V 2)− V 2)− (Gπ1(V 1)− V 1))+ (λ1 − λ2)∑
i
(
π1i − π2i
)
.
Note that the last term vanishes since
∑
i (π
1
i − π2i ) = 0. Rewriting we have:
0 = π1 · (Gπ1(V 2)− Gπ1(V 1))+ (V 1 − V 2) · KV 1(π1)+
+ π2 · (Gπ2(V 1)− Gπ2(V 2))+ (V 2 − V 1) · KV 2(π2)+
+ π1 · (Gπ2(V 2)− Gπ1(V 2))+ π2 · (Gπ1(V 1)− Gπ2(V 1)).
By Proposition 4 and (16), the first term above satisfies,
π1 · (Gπ1(V 2)− Gπ1(V 1))+ (V 1 − V 2) · KV 1(π1) 0,
and similarly for the second term.
To analyze the third term, observe that, by Assumption 8, we have:
π1 · (Gπ2(V 2)− Gπ1(V 2))+ π2 · (Gπ1(V 1)− Gπ2(V 1))−γ ∥∥π1 − π2∥∥2.
Therefore, the estimates above imply γ ‖π1 − π2‖2  0. 
Now we establish the uniqueness of the critical value:
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Gπ
(
V k
)= λk + V k.
Then λ1 = λ2.
Proof. Choose i ∈ argmaxV 1 − V 2. Then
λ1 = Gπ
(
V 1
)
i
− V 1i  Gπ
(
V 2
)
i
− V 2i = λ2.
By choosing i ∈ argminV 1 − V 2 we obtain the opposite inequality, which then implies λ1 = λ2. 
Therefore, under Assumptions 8 and 9, we have both uniqueness of the stationary distribution π and critical value λ.
We now address the uniqueness of the stationary value function V .
Theorem 4. Suppose Assumptions 4, 7, 8 and 10 hold. Let (πk,V k), k = 1,2, be stationary solutions:
KV k
(
πk
)= πk, Gπk (V k)= λk + V k,
where λk are constants. Then
(a) π1 = π2,
(b) V 2 = V 1 + k, where k is a constant vector,
(c) λ1 = λ2.
Proof. If we follow the proof of Proposition 7, we can use assumption 10 to get:
0 = −γ1
∥∥V 1 − V 2∥∥2# − γ2∥∥V 1 − V 2∥∥2# − γ ∥∥π1 − π2∥∥2.
This implies items (a) and (b). To get item (c), we observe that
V 2 + λ2 = Gπ
(
V 2
)= Gπ (V 1 + k)= Gπ (V 1)+ k = V 1 + λ1 + k = V 2 + λ1,
where π = π1 = π2, in the first and fourth equalities we used Gπ (V k) = V k +λk , in the second and fifth we used item
(b), and in the third we used the fact that Gπ commutes with constants. 
5.5. Entropy penalized stationary solutions
Now we consider the entropy penalized model. We will present a simple proof of existence of solutions that relies
on the special structure of the problem. A simple computation yields,
Gπ (V )i = −
 ln
[∑
k
e−
cik (π)+Vk


]
.
We will suppose further:
Assumption 12. The function cij (π) is continuous.
Proposition 9. Suppose Assumption 12 holds. Consider the entropy penalized model (11). Then there exists a pair of
vectors (π¯ , V¯ ) ∈ S×Rd , a constant λ¯ ∈R such that
Gπ¯ (V¯ ) = λ¯ + V¯
and π¯ = π¯ P¯ = KV¯ (π¯).
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Lπ (ψ)i =
∑
k
e−
cik (π)

 ψk.
Let e−
λπ

 be the largest eigenvalue of the operator Lπ (ψ) and ψπ the unique normalized eigenvector associated to
e−
λπ

 , i.e.,
Lπ
(
ψπ
)= e− λπ
 ψπ .
By Perron–Frobenius Theorem, ψπ is a strictly positive vector which is a continuous function of π . We can define
V π as ψπk = e−
Vπ
k


. Let E[φ]j = e−
φj

 be the exponential transformation. These operators are related by,
Lπ ◦ E = E ◦ Gπ .
Hence
Gπ (Vπ) = Vπ + λπ . (19)
Define a new probability vector,
K(π)j =
∑
i
πiPij (π,V ) =
∑
i
πi
e−
cij (π)+Vπj

∑
k e
− cik (π)+V
π
k


.
Thus we have defined a operator K : S → S which is continuous. By Brower’s fixed point theorem, K has a fixed
point π¯ . Define V¯ π¯ and λ¯π¯ as above, and P¯ij = e−
cij (π¯)+V¯ π¯j


∑
k e
− cik (π¯)+V¯
π¯
k


, then (19) holds. 
5.6. Stationary solutions with large entropy
The construction of fixed points for the entropy penalized model in the last section depends on Brower’s fixed
point theorem. In the case of large entropy we can use a contraction argument to establish the existence of a stationary
solution. Before proving and stating this result we need an elementary lemma
Lemma 1. Let T :Rn ×Rn →Rn ×Rn be a C1 mapping. Suppose,
DT =
[
E1 M
E2 E3
]
,
where Ek , M are n × n matrices. If ‖M‖ is bounded and ‖Ek‖ is sufficiently small then T 2 is a strong contraction in
S
d ×Rd/R.
Proof. It suffices to observe that
D
(
T 2
)
(x) = DT (T (x)x)DT (x)
can be written as
D
(
T 2
)= [ E˜1 M˜
E˜2 E˜3
][
E1 M
E2 E3
]
=
[
E˜1E1 + M˜E2 E˜1M + M˜E3
E˜2E1 + E˜3E2 E˜2M + E˜3E3
]
,
and therefore ‖D(T 2)‖ < 1. 
To establish the main result in this section we need to replace Assumption 12 by:
Assumption 13. The function cij (π) is a C1 function.
322 D.A. Gomes et al. / J. Math. Pures Appl. 93 (2010) 308–328Proposition 10. Suppose Assumption 13 holds. Then, for large 
, there is a unique stationary solution. Additionally,
let T (π,V ) = (KV,
(π),Gπ (V )), then T 2 is a strong contraction.
Proof. From Proposition 5 we have ‖Gπ (V )‖# is uniformly bounded. Therefore it suffices to show that the operator
(K,G) is a strong contraction for V in a compact set (with respect to the norm ‖ · ‖#). Also, we can replace G by:
Gˆπ (V )i = Gπ (V )i − 1
d
∑
k
Gπ (V )k,
and KV (π) by
KˆV (π)i = KV (π)i − 1
d
(∑
j
KV (π)j − 1
)
.
Since any fixed point to (Gˆ, Kˆ) is a stationary solution. In this way ‖Gπ (V )‖# = ‖Gˆπ (V )‖, and for any π (not neces-
sarily a probability measure), KˆV (π) is a probability measure, and agrees with KV (π) if π is a probability measure.
We will show that, for 
 sufficiently large, the pair (Gˆ, Kˆ) satisfies the hypothesis of Lemma 1. To do so, we first
compute the matrix, [ ∂G
∂V
∂G
∂π
∂K
∂V
∂K
∂π
]
.
We will show that, when 
 → ∞, this matrix converges to,[ [1/d] [ 1
d
∑
k
∂cik
∂πj
]
[0] [1/d]
]
,
where we denote by [a] the d × d matrix whose entries are all identical to a.
Since Gπ,
(V )i = −
 ln(∑k e− cik (π)+Vk
 ), we have:(
∂Gπ (V )
∂Vj
)
i
= e
− cij (π)+Vj

∑
k e
− cik (π)+Vk


−→ 1/d,
when 
 → ∞. We also have:
(
∂Gπ (V )
∂πj
)
i
=
∑
k
∂cik(π)
∂πj
e−
cij (π)+Vj


∑
k e
− cik (π)+Vk


−→ 1
d
∑
k
∂cik(π)
∂πj
,
when 
 → ∞.
Now we consider KV (π)i =∑k πkPki , where
Pki = e
− cki (π)+Vi

∑
l e
− ckl (π)+Vl


.
We have:
(
∂KV (π)
∂πj
)
i
= Pji +
∑
k
πk
∑
l e
− ckl (π)+Vl

 e−
cki (π)+Vi

 (
∂ckl (π)
∂πj
− ∂cki (π)
∂πj
)

(
∑
l e
− ckl (π)+Vl

 )2
.
If we take 
 → ∞, the second term tends to zero while Pij → 1d . Thus(
∂KV¯ ,
(π¯)
∂πj
)
i
−→ 1
d
.
Since
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∂KV¯ ,
(π¯)
∂Vj
)
i
=
∑
k
πk
∑
l e
− ckl (π)+Vl

 e−
cki (π)+Vi

 (δlj − δkj )

(
∑
l e
− ckl (π)+Vl

 )2
,
we obtain: (
∂KV¯ ,
(π¯)
∂Vj
)
i
−→ 0,
when 
 → ∞.
Finally, observe that [
∂Gˆ
∂V
∂Gˆ
∂π
∂Kˆ
∂V
∂Kˆ
∂π
]
=
[
I − [1/d] [0]
[0] I − [1/d]
][ ∂G
∂V
∂G
∂π
∂K
∂V
∂K
∂π
]
.
This shows that, in the limit 
 → ∞, we have:[(
∂Gˆ
∂V
∂Gˆ
∂π
∂Kˆ
∂V
∂Kˆ
∂π
)]
→
[ [0] M
[0] [0]
]
,
where
M = (I − [1/d])[ 1
d
∑
k
∂cik
∂πj
]
.
Thus, for 
 large enough Lemma 1 yields the strong contraction property of T 2. 
5.7. Optimal stationary solutions
Given a probability measure ηij , 1  i, j  d , define πηi =
∑
j ηij and let P
η
ij be a stochastic matrix such that
ηij = πηi P ηij . If πη never vanishes then Pη is uniquely defined by Pηij = ηijπηi . A probability measure ηij is stationary, if,∑
j
ηij =
∑
j
ηji . (20)
For our purposes, in this section it is convenient to consider the following two auxiliary assumptions:
Assumption 14. For each 1 i  d the mapping Pi· 	→∑j cij (Pi·)Pij is convex.
Assumption 15. The mapping η 	→∑i,j πηcij (P ηi· )P ηij is strictly convex.
Consider a C1 convex function f :Rd →R. Consider the problem:
min
η
∑
ij
π
η
i cij
(
Pη
)
P
η
ij + f
(
πη
)
, (21)
where the minimum is taken over all probability measures η satisfying (20).
Proposition 11. Let η > 0 be a solution of (21). Let V η ∈Rd be the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint
(20), and λη the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to ∑ij ηij = 1. Then (πη,V η) is a stationary solution of,
V η + λη = Gπη
(
V η
)
,
where
Gπ (V )i = ∂f
∂πi
(π) + min
Pi·
∑
j
cij (Pi·)Pij + PijVj .
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functional:
f (π) +
∑
i
πi
[(∑
j
cij (P )Pij + V ηj Pij
)
− V ηi − λη
]
. (22)
Consequently, for each i, Pi· is a critical point of,∑
j
cij (P )Pij + V ηj Pij ,
which by the convexity hypothesis, Assumption 14, is a minimizer. Furthermore, by differentiating (22) with respect
to πi , we obtain:
Vi + λη = Gπη
(
V η
)
i
.
Finally, we can write (20) as
πη = KV η
(
πη
)
,
which ends the proof. 
Proposition 12. Suppose Assumptions 7, and 15 hold. Then there exists at most one stationary solution with π,P > 0.
Proof. This proposition follows from the well-known fact (see for instance [6]) that for strictly convex objective
functions under linear constraints the KKT conditions are not only necessary but also sufficient. 
Note that if f is a strictly convex function, then the previous proposition gives us another proof of the existence
and uniqueness of the stationary solution in the case cij (π,P ) = c˜ij (Pi·) + W(π), with W(π) = ∂f∂πi (π).
6. Solutions to the mean field game initial-terminal value problem
In this section we prove the existence (Section 6.1) and uniqueness (Section 6.2) of solutions to the initial-terminal
value problem.
6.1. Existence of solutions
Theorem 5. Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. Then for any initial probability vector π˜ ∈ S and terminal cost V˜
there exists a solution {(
πn,V n
);0 nN}
to the initial-terminal value problem for the mean field game with π0 = π˜ and V N = V˜ .
Proof. Suppose we are given a sequence πn,0 ∈ SN+1 of probability vectors, with π0,0 = π˜ . Define, for 0 nN ,
V n,0 = Gπn,0
(
V n+1,0
)
,
with V N,0 = V˜ . Then let
πn+1,1 = KV n,0
(
πn,1
)
,
with π0,1 = π˜ . This procedure defines a continuous mapping from SN+1 into itself that associates to the sequence
πn,0 the new sequence of probability vectors πn,1. Therefore, by Brower’s fixed point theorem, it has a fixed point,
which corresponds to a solution to the problem. 
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As for stationary solution we adapt Lasry and Lions monotonicity arguments to obtain uniqueness of solutions.
Theorem 6. Suppose Assumptions 4, 7 and 8 hold. Let {(πn,V n);0 nN} and {(π˜n, V˜ n);0 nN} be solutions
of the mean field game with π0 = π˜0 and V N = V˜ N . Then πn = π˜n, and V n = V˜ n, for all 0 nN .
Proof. We have:
Gπn
(
V n+1
)= V n, KV n+1(πn)= πn+1,
and
Gπ˜n
(
V˜ n+1
)= V˜ n, K
V˜ n+1
(
π˜n
)= π˜n+1.
Then
0 =
N−1∑
n=0
(
V n+1 − V˜ n+1) · [(KV n+1(πn)− πn+1)− (KV˜ n+1(π˜n)− π˜n+1)]
+
N−1∑
n=0
(
πn − π˜n) · [(Gπ˜n(V˜ n+1)− V˜ n)− (Gπn(V n+1)− V n)].
Note that (V N − V˜ N ) · (π˜N − πN) = 0 and (π0 − π˜0) · (V 0 − V˜ 0) = 0. Thus rewriting the identity above we have:
0 =
N−1∑
n=0
πn · (Gπn(V˜ n+1)− Gπn(V n+1))+ KV n+1(πn) · (V n+1 − V˜ n+1)
+
N−1∑
n=0
π˜n · (Gπ˜n(V n+1)− Gπ˜n(V˜ n+1))+ KV˜ n+1(π˜n) · (V˜ n+1 − V n+1)
+
N−1∑
n=0
πn · (Gπ˜n(V˜ n+1)− Gπn(V˜ n+1))+ π˜n · (Gπn(V n+1)− Gπ˜n(V n+1)).
Now, using (16), we have, for each 0 nN − 1,
πn · (Gπn(V˜ n+1)− Gπn(V n+1))+ KV n+1(πn) · (V n+1 − V˜ n+1) 0,
and similarly for the terms of the second line. In the third line we have
πn · (Gπ˜n(V˜ n+1)− Gπn(V˜ n+1))+ π˜n · (Gπn(V n+1)− Gπ˜n(V n+1))−γ ∥∥πn − π˜n∥∥2.
Hence
N−1∑
n=0
γ
∥∥πn − π˜n∥∥2  0.
This implies πn = π˜n for all 0 nN .
To obtain V n = V˜ n for all 0  n  N , we just have to use V N = V˜ N and apply iteratively the operator
Gπn(V n+1) = V n and Gπ˜n (V˜ n+1) = V˜ n, from n = N − 1 to n = 0. 
7. Convergence to equilibrium
In this last section we discuss the main contribution of this paper, namely the exponential convergence to equi-
librium for the initial-terminal value problem. Our setting is the following: consider a initial-terminal value problem
with initial data π−N and terminal data V N . We will now study conditions under which π0 → π¯ and V 0 → V¯ where
(π¯ , V¯ ) are stationary solutions, as N → ∞. In fact we will show this is true if Assumptions 4, 7, 8, 10 and 11 hold.
The authors were told by P. L. Lions of another proof of exponential convergence to equilibrium for continuous state
and time problems. However, the techniques are different from the ones discussed in this section.
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We start by establishing some useful a priori bounds.
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumption 4, 7, and 11 holds. Let {(πn,V n);−N  n  N} and {(π˜n, V˜ n);−N  n N} be
two solutions of the mean field game. Then we have:∥∥V˜ −N − V −N∥∥ ∥∥V˜ N − V N∥∥+ N2K. (23)
Proof. Applying Proposition 4 we have that
GπN−1
(
V˜ N
)
i
− GπN−1
(
V N
)
i

∑
j
P
VN ,πN−1
ij
(
V˜ Nj − V Nj
)
.
Then
GπN−1
(
V˜ N
)
i
− Gπ˜N−1
(
V˜ N
)
i
+ V˜ N−1i − V N−1i 
∥∥V˜ N − V N∥∥,
also we have:
GπN−1
(
V˜ N
)
i
− Gπ˜N−1
(
V˜ N
)
i

∑
j
[
cij
(
πN−1,P V˜
N ,π˜N−1
i·
)− cij (π˜N−1,P V˜ N ,π˜N−1i· )]P V˜ N ,π˜N−1ij K.
Hence,
V˜ N−1i − V N−1i 
∥∥V˜ N − V N∥∥+ K.
Exchanging the roles of (πN−1,V N) and (π˜N−1, V˜ N ) we get
V N−1i − V˜ N−1i 
∥∥V˜ N − V N∥∥+ K,
thus ∥∥V˜ N−1 − V N−1∥∥ ∥∥V˜ N − V N∥∥+ K.
Reasoning by induction we obtain that∥∥V˜ −N − V −N∥∥ ∥∥V˜ N − V N∥∥+ N2K. 
7.2. Exponential convergence
We recover the proof of Theorem 6 to obtain an important estimate:
Proposition 13. Suppose Assumptions 4, 7, 8 and 10 hold. Let {(πn,V n);−N  nN} and {(π˜n, V˜ n);−N  nN}
be solutions to the mean field game. Let C = 1/γ . Then
N−1∑
n=−N+1
∥∥πn − π˜n∥∥2 + ∥∥V n − V˜ n∥∥2#  C(∥∥πN − π˜N∥∥2 + ∥∥V N − V˜ N∥∥2# + ∥∥π−N − π˜−N∥∥2 + ∥∥V −N − V˜ −N∥∥2#).
Proof. As before, observe that
0 =
N−1∑
n=−N
(
V n+1 − V˜ n+1) · [(KV n+1(πn)− πn+1)− (KV˜ n+1(π˜n)− π˜n+1)]
+
N−1∑
n=−N
(
πn − π˜n) · [(Gπ˜n(V˜ n+1)− V˜ n)− (Gπn(V n+1)− V n)].
Then rewriting the equation above we have:
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n=−N
(
V n+1 − V˜ n+1) · (πn+1 − π˜n+1)− (V n − V˜ n) · (πn − π˜n)
=
N−1∑
n=−N
πn · (Gπn(V˜ n+1)− Gπn(V n+1))+ KV n+1(πn) · (V n+1 − V˜ n+1)
+
N−1∑
n=N
π˜n · (Gπ˜n(V n+1)− Gπ˜n(V˜ n+1))+ KV˜ n+1(π˜n) · (V˜ n+1 − V n+1)
+
N−1∑
n=−N
πn · (Gπ˜n(V˜ n+1)− Gπn(V˜ n+1))+ π˜n · (Gπn(V n+1)− Gπ˜n(V n+1)).
Now, for each −N  nN − 1, we have that
πn · (Gπn(V˜ n+1)− Gπn(V n+1))+ KV n+1(πn) · (V n+1 − V˜ n+1)−γ ∥∥V n+1 − V˜ n+1∥∥2#,
and similarly for the terms of the second line. In the third line we have:
πn · (Gπ˜n(V˜ n+1)− Gπn(V˜ n+1))+ π˜n · (Gπn(V n+1)− Gπ˜n(V n+1))−γ ∥∥πn − π˜n∥∥2.
Consequently
N−1∑
n=−N
∥∥πn − π˜n∥∥2 + 2∥∥V n+1 − V˜ n+1∥∥2#  1γ
((
πN − π˜N ) · (V˜ N − V N )+ (π−N − π˜−N ) · (V −N − V˜ −N )).
Note that, if c is the constant vector then (πk − π˜ k) · μ = 0, where k = N,−N . Also, there exists μk such that
‖V˜ k − V k‖ = |V˜ k − V k + μk|. Hence
N−1∑
n=−N+1
∥∥πn − π˜n∥∥2 + ∥∥V n − V˜ n∥∥2#  C(∥∥πN − π˜N∥∥2 + ∥∥V N − V˜ N∥∥2# + ∥∥π−N − π˜−N∥∥2 + ∥∥V −N − V˜ −N∥∥2#),
if we denote C = 1/γ . 
Define f0 = ‖π0 − π˜0‖2 + ‖V 0 − V˜ 0‖2#, and for n > 0,
fn =
∥∥πn − π˜n∥∥2 + ∥∥V n − V˜ n∥∥2# + ∥∥π−n − π˜−n∥∥2 + ∥∥V −n − V˜ −n∥∥2#.
The previous proposition implies:
N−1∑
n=0
fn  CfN. (24)
Note that the previous proposition and Lemma 2 imply:
fN 
∥∥πN − π˜N∥∥2 + ∥∥π−N − π˜−N∥∥2 + ∥∥V N − V˜ N∥∥2# + (∥∥V N − V˜ N∥∥+ N2K)2. (25)
The next lemma is the only missing tool to get exponential decay:
Lemma 3. Suppose fn  0 and that
N−1∑
n=0
fn  CfN. (26)
Then
f0  C
(
C
C + 1
)N−1
fN .
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f0  Cf1.
Now, observe that
CfN+1 
N∑
n=0
fn  f0 +
N∑
n=1
1
C
(
C + 1
C
)n−1
f0
= f0
[
1 + 1
C
(C+1
C
)N − 1
C+1
C
− 1
]
= f0
[
1 +
(
C + 1
C
)N
− 1
]
= f0
(
C + 1
C
)N
,
which ends the proof. 
Theorem 7. Suppose Assumptions 4, 7, 8, 10 and 11 hold. Fix V˜ , π˜ . Given N > 0, denote by (π0N,V
0
N) the solution
of the mean field game at time 0 that has initial distribution π−N = π˜ and terminal cost V N = V˜ .
Then, as N → ∞
V 0N → V¯
(
in Rd/R
)
, π0N → π¯
where V¯ and π¯ is the unique stationary solution.
Proof. By Theorem 6, we can define, for each N , a map ΞN : S × Rd/R → S × Rd/R, that associates to each
pair (π˜ , V˜ ) the pair (π0N,V
0
N). Here S× Rd/R is given the product topology where in Rd/R we consider the norm‖U‖# = infk∈R ‖U + k‖.
Now, Lemma 3 and Eq. (25) show that, for any two pairs (V ,π) and (V˜ , π˜), we have:
ΞN(V,π) − ΞN(V˜ , π˜) → (0,0)
as N → ∞. Thus,
ΞN(V,π) − (V¯ , π¯) = ΞN(V,π) − ΞN(V¯ , π¯) → (0,0)
as N → ∞. 
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